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ARTICLE OPEN
Gigahertz measurement-device-independent quantum key
distribution using directly modulated lasers
R. I. Woodward 1,2✉, Y. S. Lo1,3, M. Pittaluga 1,4, M. Minder 1,5, T. K. Paraïso1, M. Lucamarini1, Z. L. Yuan 1 and A. J. Shields1
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) is a technique for quantum-secured communication that
eliminates all detector side-channels, although is currently limited by implementation complexity and low secure key rates. Here,
we introduce a simple and compact MDI-QKD system design at gigahertz clock rates with enhanced resilience to laser fluctuations
—thus enabling free-running semiconductor laser sources to be employed without spectral or phase feedback. This is achieved
using direct laser modulation, carefully exploiting gain-switching and injection-locking laser dynamics to encode phase-modulated
time-bin bits. Our design enables secure key rates that improve upon the state of the art by an order of magnitude, up to 8 bps at
54 dB channel loss and 2 kbps in the finite-size regime for 30 dB channel loss. This greatly simplified MDI-QKD system design and
proof-of-principle demonstration shows that MDI-QKD is a practical, high-performance solution for future quantum communication
networks.
npj Quantum Information            (2021) 7:58 ; https://doi.org/10.1038/s41534-021-00394-2
INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a maturing technology that
enables distant communication with information-theoretic secur-
ity1,2. The development of such systems is particularly important at
present as advances in quantum computation pose a growing
threat to current security models based on public-key crypto-
graphy. While QKD offers unbreakable security in theory, the
practical deviation of real-world components from their ideal
properties can introduce side channels that could be exploited by
an eavesdropper. For example, a number of attacks on single-
photon detectors (SPDs) have already been reported, as these are
typically the most vulnerable components3.
To eliminate these side channels, measurement-device-
independent QKD (MDI-QKD)4 (see also5) has emerged as a
promising new approach. Here, the two communicating users
(Alice and Bob) independently encode and transmit light pulses to
a central node (Charlie), which interferes them and measures the
result using SPDs. This measurement indicates the correlation
between bits, but not their values, which remain known to only
Alice and Bob. This makes the protocol secure even if Charlie acts
as a malicious party. To emphasise this important detail, Charlie is
often denoted ‘untrusted’, meaning that no trust has to be put on
the intermediate node to guarantee the full security of the MDI-
QKD protocol.
Numerous recent works have demonstrated the potential of
MDI-QKD, showcasing transmission distances up to 404 km6, field
trials7–9 and photonic-chip implementations10, alongside ongoing
theoretical advancements11–16. However, the majority of MDI-QKD
demonstrations to date have operated with low (sub-100 MHz)
clock rates, which has limited achievable bit rates17. While
gigahertz-clocked MDI-QKD systems have very recently been
realised using polarisation encoding18,19, for practical deploy-
ments, time-bin encoding is preferred as it provides inherent
immunity to depolarisation and polarisation-mode dispersion. An
additional obstacle to date has been the implementation
complexity of MDI-QKD systems—in particular, the requirement
for additional servo links between Alice and Bob as it is believed
that instabilities in independent laser sources make high-quality
two-photon interference impossible without stabilisation by active
feedback9. Significant progress is therefore still needed to develop
practical high-bit-rate MDI-QKD systems which are sufficiently
compact and robust for real-world environments.
In this Letter, we demonstrate a decisive advance in this
direction with a compact, simplified, gigahertz-clocked MDI-QKD
system that improves upon state-of-the-art secure key rates by up
to an order of magnitude. Much of the experimental complexity of
previous MDI-QKD systems is eliminated by using directly
modulated lasers to implement bit encoding, which allows us to
remove the phase/polarisation modulators that have previously
been required. We also disprove the requirement for active
feedback by showing that increased clock rates significantly
improve the phase error robustness against free-running laser
fluctuations, paving the way to practical deployment.
RESULTS
Bit encoding
In single-photon time-bin-encoded MDI-QKD, Alice and Bob
prepare qubits in one of two bases: Z-basis states with the bit
value encoded by the position of a photon in either the early ( 0j i)
or late ( 1j i) time bin of the clock period; or X-basis states
comprising a coherent superposition of a photon across both time
bins with bit value encoded in the phase between them,




, where ϕ is 0 or π for the þj i and j i states,
respectively. Here, we implement the decoy-state MDI-QKD
protocol, using attenuated pulsed laser sources to generate weak
coherent states, with decoy states to bound single-photon
events4,12,16. The generated pulses from each user must be
indistinguishable in all degrees of freedom, such that high-
visibility two-photon Hong–Ou–Mandel (HOM) interference
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between phase-randomised time bins can occur at Charlie20,21. This
places exacting requirements on the light sources and previously
reported MDI-QKD experiments have required multiple intensity
and phase (or polarisation) modulators to achieve this6–10.
In our MDI-QKD system (illustrated in Fig. 1), we generate
encoded bit states using directly modulated injection-locked gain-
switched lasers. The optical injection locking technique enables
precise control of phase between pulses, in addition to increasing
laser modulation bandwidth and decreasing pulse chirp and
jitter22,23. Both Alice and Bob employ identical transmitter designs,
including a pair of distributed feedback (DFB) lasers in a primary/
secondary (i.e. master/slave) arrangement with thermoelectric
controllers for temperature stabilisation. The ‘primary’ laser of
each pair is gain switched at 1 GHz clock rate, periodically bringing
the laser above threshold so that each primary pulse acquires a
random optical phase. These pulses are then injected through a
circulator into the ‘secondary’ laser, which is gain switched at
2 GHz to generate two secondary pulses within each primary
pulse, effectively forming the early and late time bins for each
clock period. As secondary pulses are seeded by the injected
primary pulses, they inherit the phase of the injected light and the
output pulse jitter and chirp are significantly reduced24,25. The
secondary laser output is then filtered to remove any spurious
spontaneous emission and attenuated to the single-photon level
(see Methods for further details).
For Z-basis encoding, the electrical signal to the secondary laser is
patterned, selectively turning the laser on in only one time bin of
each bit period. For X-basis encoding, an amplitude perturbation is
selectively added in the middle of the electrical driving signal
applied to the primary laser, changing the laser dynamics and
slightly adjusting the output phase (Fig. 1 inset). As two secondary
pulses are seeded by each primary pulse, this electrically controlled
phase perturbation offers a versatile solution for adjusting the
relative phase between the secondary pulses, which represent early
and late time bins within a coherent state. In both bases, the global
phase of each coherent state is random as seeded by a new primary
pulse each time, thus satisfying the security condition of MDI-QKD
based on decoy states4. The duration of optical pulses in our setup is
measured to be 75 ps and their phase randomisation is confirmed
by interfering pulses from adjacent coherent states using an
unbalanced Mach–Zehnder interferometer and measuring the
output intensity probability distribution (see Supplementary Note 1).
The setup in Charlie comprises a 50% beam splitter followed by
two superconducting nanowire SPDs with time-tagging electro-
nics to measure the result of interfering pulses from Alice and Bob.
By careful temporal alignment of the laser-driving waveforms
applied in the transmitters (generating pulses with mean photon
number commensurate with our later QKD experiments), we
achieve a HOM interference visibility, V, of 47% (Fig. 2a) at 1 GHz
clock rate, close to the 50% theoretical maximum.
To perform MDI-QKD, Alice and Bob randomly choose a basis
and bit value, then send encoded weak coherent states to Charlie.
By measuring the time-resolved output of the interference, these
states are projected in the so-called Bell basis where certain time-
resolved co-incident detections indicate a successful Bell-state
measurement (BSM).
Overcoming laser frequency drift
While the optical frequency difference between Alice and Bob’s
lasers must be small to ensure spectral indistinguishability, there is
an additional subtlety that places even tighter requirements on
minimising this difference: X-basis phase misalignment. Since






X: bit 0 X: bit 1 Z: bit 0 Z: bit 1
Phase randomisation
between bits
Fig. 1 MDI-QKD system experimental setup. LD laser diode, Circ circulator, VOA variable optical attenuator, BS beamsplitter, SPD single-
photon detector. The inset illustration (top) shows the electrical signals applied to the lasers and the corresponding optical output for each
basis/bit encoding.
Fig. 2 Interference between pulses from Alice & Bob.
a Hong–Ou–Mandel interference as a function of temporal delay.
b Measured QBER as a function of spectral detuning between Alice
& Bob’s lasers.
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bins, a laser optical frequency detuning Δf (not to be confused
with the pulse generation rate) between Alice and Bob will
misalign the phase basis, increasing the quantum bit error rate
(QBER). Specifically, QBER varies sinusoidally with phase error Δϕ,
where Δϕ is related to time-bin spacing Δt by:
Δϕ ¼ 2πΔtΔf : (1)
The impact of this effect is observed experimentally by
measuring the X-basis QBER as the wavelengths of Bob’s lasers
are varied through thermal tuning (Fig. 2b), while the wavelengths
of Alice’s lasers are unchanged. Fringes are observed as the phase
error varies periodically between 0 and π, with 2 GHz period (as
expected since our time-bin spacing is 500 ps). As our transmitters
generate weak coherent states, the contribution from multiphoton
events sets the theoretical minimum QBER as 25% in the X-basis4.
Figure 2b also shows that the fringe amplitude decreases with
increasing detuning, due to reducing spectral indistinguishability
causing reduced HOM interference visibility. The Z-basis QBER is
also measured and observed to show no dependence upon
spectral detuning (Fig. 2b), as expected since interference is not
required to produce Z-basis Bell-state correlations.
To understand the practical importance of this effect on MDI-
QKD systems, we consider the typical spectral detuning that can
occur between independent free-running lasers (e.g. arising from
uncontrolled thermal/mechanical perturbations) with only ther-
moelectric temperature stabilisation. The outputs from Alice’s and
Bob’s lasers, which are typical telecommunication-grade devices,
are interfered on a photodetector and the beat note is recorded
over a 48-h period. As shown in Fig. 3(a), the spectral difference
varies by more than 30 MHz.
The impact of this laser frequency detuning is first considered for
an example MDI-QKD clock rate of 75MHz (as used by numerous
prior MDI-QKD demonstrations6–8), which corresponds to time-bin
separation, Δt= 6.67 ns assuming equally spaced time bins within
each bit period. Using Eq. (1), we compute that this intrinsic spectral
fluctuation causes over 0.4π phase error, which could increase the X-
basis QBER by as much as 17%. This is a significant increase which
could prevent the generation of a secure key. Indeed, this problem
has necessitated the addition of servo links and active feedback to
stabilise laser wavelengths in previous studies, for example using
either additional lasers as a phase reference7 or a regular beat note
measurement to control an additional included frequency shifter26.
It has even been stated that long-term high-visibility HOM
interference is impossible to achieve without active stabilisation9.
An alternative recent solution was the use of a more complex
protocol, known as reference-frame-independent MDI-QKD, prepar-
ing states in three conjugate bases where only one basis is well
defined, although with the added complexity of requiring the
preparation of three basis states rather than two27.
We solve this problem in our system very simply, however, by
using a gigahertz clock rate so that the time-bin separation is
significantly reduced to 500 ps. Using Eq. (1), the 30 MHz laser drift
is calculated to induce 0.03 π phase error here, which corresponds
to only 0.11% X-basis QBER increase. This demonstrates the effect
of spectral fluctuations on our system is negligible, eliminating the
need for active feedback. To further illustrate this phenomenon,
Fig. 3(b) shows the theoretically computed QBER increase due to
this phase error with respect to clock rate and spectral difference.
Fringes (shown by red bands, where the worst-case scenario 50%
QBER indicates random selection) are observed as a function of
spectral difference, which increase in period with increasing clock
rate. Therefore, greater clock rates permit a large spectral
difference between Alice’s and Bob’s lasers before the QBER
increases significantly. This analysis reveals that smaller temporal
separation between time bins makes the system intrinsically more
robust against laser wavelength fluctuations.
To assess the long-term stability of our setup, the QBER is
recorded over a 48-h period (Fig. 4). Excellent stability is observed,
with 0.08% QBER standard deviation in the Z-basis QBER and
0.39% in the X-basis, and no long-term performance drift. This
error could be caused by residual indistinguishability of the states
due to minor temporal modulation imperfections.
Decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol
We use a decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol to bound single-photon
yields and errors12,16. Specifically, a four-intensity decoy-state
protocol16,18 is chosen, comprising a single signal state (s) in the Z-
basis and three decoy states (u, v, and w) in the X-basis. Pulses in
the Z-basis are used to distil a secure key while X-basis events are
used to bound information leakage to a potential eavesdropper.
As well as presenting results in the asymptotic regime, we also
apply two different methods to account for finite-size effects, both
with final security parameter, ϵ < 10−10. The first assumes that
statistical fluctuations follow a Gaussian distribution11—a widely
used assumption e.g. refs. 18,28,29—while the second makes no
such assumptions and applies the Chernoff bound to guarantee
composable security against even the most general eavesdropper
attacks14,18 (see Supplementary Note 2 for further details and key
rate analysis).
Finally, we note that all protocol parameters (i.e. state intensities
and preparation probabilities) have been carefully optimised. This
was achieved by simulating the protocol including measured
component parameters18,30 and numerically optimising for max-
imum secure key rate (see Supplementary Note 3).
Fig. 3 Laser detuning analysis. a Experimental time-varying
spectral detuning Δf between Alice’s and Bob’s free-running DFB
lasers. b Computed X-basis QBER arising from phase error as a
function of detuning and clock rate (assuming equally spaced time
bins), showing that a higher clock rate permits greater spectral
detuning without significant QBER increase.
Fig. 4 MDI-QKD system stability. Measured QBER in X-basis and Z-
basis showing long-term stability.
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MDI-QKD system performance
We demonstrate proof-of-principle gigahertz-clocked MDI-QKD at
various communication channel lengths, emulated using a
variable optical attenuator and assuming the channel comprises
ultra-low-loss fibre (0.16 dB km−1). In each case, the total channel
loss is comprised of equal losses for the Alice-to-Charlie link and
the Bob-to-Charlie link. Optimised parameters and tabulated
gains/QBER measurements are presented in the Supplementary
Tables. QBERs as low as 0.55% are recorded in the Z-bases and as
low as 26.6% in the X-bases, close to the 25% theoretical
minimum.
Measurements for all possible states are then processed to
estimate achievable secure key rates, as shown in Fig. 5 together
with other state-of-the-art proof-of-principle MDI-QKD demonstra-
tions6,10,18,19,26. When accounting for finite-size effects, a secure
key can be generated up to 42 dB total loss (263 km). Secure key
rates of 1.97 kbps and 58 bps are recorded at 30 dB (188 km) and
40 dB (250 km), respectively. Key rates are reduced slightly when
applying the more restrictive finite-size security analysis, which
ensures composable security against the most general attacks, but
still achieving 1.12 kbps at 30 dB (188 km) and operation up to
36 dB. Figure 5 shows that even higher key rates and larger
channel losses are possible in the asymptotic regime, with 8 bps
key rate measured for 54 dB channel loss. However, for practical
MDI-QKD implementations, it is essential to consider finite-size
effects. Compared to prior state-of-the-art results17, our GHz MDI-
QKD system design enables significantly improved key rates in the
finite-size regime by approximately an order of magnitude for
channel losses up to 42 dB.
Performance at channel losses below 30 dB could not be
measured experimentally due to saturation of our SPDs at high
count rates, although we include simulation results which are well
fitted by the experimental data. This suggests that with higher
maximum count rate SPDs (e.g. avalanche photodiodes), our
system could achieve >1 Mbps MDI-QKD at metropolitan/access
network distances (e.g. <25 km).
DISCUSSION
In this work we have demonstrated a simplified approach to MDI-
QKD by employing directly modulated semiconductor lasers at
gigahertz clock rates, enabling high-speed quantum communica-
tion without detector vulnerabilities. Coherent states are encoded
by varying the electrical waveforms that are applied to laser
diodes, exploiting gain-switching and optical injection locking
techniques to carefully manipulate intensity and phase. While
previous works have employed injection-locking and gain-
switching of lasers to generate pulses for MDI-QKD applica-
tions18,19, a fixed amplitude driving signal has always been used
meaning subsequent phase/polarisation modulators were
required to actually encode bit information onto the pulses. Our
approach uses a similar injection-locked gain-switched laser
arrangement, but applies a carefully modulated electrical wave-
form to harness the laser dynamics such that time-bin phase-
encoded states are produced directly, eliminating the need for
subsequent bit modulation. In addition to removing significant
complexity, this approach is highly versatile as the clock rate can
be varied in-situ. We demonstrate that with a 1 GHz clock rate and
fully optimising all system parameters with a finite-size security
analysis, record secure key rates are achieved. We have also shown
how the high clock rate relaxes the influence of inherent laser
spectral variations, further reducing complexity by remaining
robust despite the use of independent, free-running DFB lasers.
Compared to other recent high-clock-rate MDI-QKD implemen-
tations that employed polarisation encoding, our time-bin
encoding scheme offers advantages due to its greater immunity
to polarisation-related decoherence: the probability of a photon
moving from one time bin to another is very small, whereas
rotation between polarisation states using polarisation encoding is
unavoidable in long-distance fibres. In addition, with our directly
modulated transmitter design, it is simple to achieve low (<1%)
QBER for the key-generating basis since bits are encoded by on-off
keying the laser source, thus ensuring maximum orthogonality
between bit 0 and 1 states. Our simplified transmitter design and
elimination of wavelength-stabilising servo links therefore miti-
gates the barriers of high system size, cost and complexity, which
has thus far limited practical MDI-QKD deployments.
The injection-locked gain-switched laser design is also well-suited
for photonic-chip-scale implementations10,31, offering a route to
ultra-compact mass-manufacturable QKD systems without detector
vulnerabilities. Our results suggest that >1Mbps secure key rates are
possible over metropolitan/access network distances of up to 25 km
and we note that the MDI-QKD architecture is well suited for building
QKD networks in a star topology8, with the high-cost SPDs in a
central location and many users possessing only a compact low-cost
transmitter. Recent results have also demonstrated multiplexing of
classical and quantum signals in MDI-QKD, even revealing that MDI-
QKD offers improved resilience to Raman noise compared to
conventional point-to-point QKD32. MDI-QKD is therefore posed to
Fig. 5 MDI-QKD system performance. Secure key rate with respect to total channel loss (and equivalent distance in ultra-low loss 0.16 dB
km−1 fibre) is shown for the asymptotic (circular markers), finite size (triangular markers) and finite size with composable security (square
markers) analyses. Our experimental data (filled markers) are in good agreement with numerical simulations (solid lines) based on our
experimental parameters. State-of-the-art results from literature are also shown using unfilled markers6,10,18,19,26.
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play a valuable role in the real-world exploitation of quantum
communications.
It is also interesting to consider extending the directly modulated
laser scheme to higher clock rates, which could lead to increased
key rates and even greater permissible spectral detuning between
Alice and Bob without a phase error penalty. There are two
challenges to this goal: firstly, higher speed electronics are needed
to generate electrical patterns with shorter modulation features; and
secondly, laser sources are required with greater modulation
bandwidth. The latter aspect is the primary obstacle, with current
commercial laser diodes limited to ~10 GHz bandwidth—therefore,
increasing clock rates beyond a few GHz using current laser sources
will lead to inter-pulse correlations33, which violates the requirement
for phase-randomised bits. Future advances in laser technology offer
to circumvent this limit, however, with recent impressive progress in
higher-modulation bandwidth lasers (e.g. >10s GHz) through careful
device engineering34 and further optimisation of optical feedback
and injection locking35.
It should be noted that our progress is compatible with the new
embodiment of the MDI-QKD concept that uses single (rather than
co-incident) event detection, known as twin-field QKD36,37. This
enables quantum-secured communication over remarkable dis-
tances, exceeding 500 km of fibre38, provided there is phase
coherence between light arriving from Alice and Bob. This
requirement could be fulfilled by estimating locally in Alice’s
and Bob’s modules the phase difference between the primary
lasers and a common reference light distributed by means of
frequency dissemination techniques.
In conclusion, we have demonstrated a system design for
quantum-secured communications using injection-locked gain-
switched laser sources, which is immune from detector side-
channel attacks. Our approach enabled time-bin encoding at
gigahertz clock speeds in a simple, compact setup, improving
upon state-of-the-art MDI-QKD key rates by around an order of
magnitude, with up to 8 bps at 54 dB channel losses in the
asymptotic regime and up to 7 bps at 42 dB accounting for finite-
size effects. With high-performance yet a simple design, MDI-QKD
has strong potential for practical communication applications.
METHODS
Transmitters
Each transmitter comprises two telecommunications-grade DFB lasers with
1550.12 nm nominal centre wavelength and an integrated thermoelectric
cooler. The primary laser includes an internal isolator to prevent back
reflection, while the secondary laser is unisolated, enabling optical
injection through a circulator. Each laser is driven by an electrical
waveform from a signal generator, combined with a DC bias using a
bias-tee. The primary (secondary) laser is gain switched at 1 GHz with 85%
duty cycle (2 GHz with 30% duty cycle) and the primary/secondary
waveforms are carefully temporally aligned to ensure two secondary
pulses are generated within each injected primary pulse. The RF amplitude,
DC bias and (thermally tuned) wavelength of the primary and secondary
lasers are carefully adjusted to optimise the quality of the generated
pulses: ensuring >99% phase coherence transfer by injection from primary
to secondary, phase randomisation between each coherent state and
indistinguishability between the two transmitters such that high-visibility
HOM can be observed. We achieve optimum performance with 45mA bias
current applied to the primary lasers, 22 mA bias to the secondary lasers
and ~150 μW injection power, where the free-running wavelength of the
primary and secondary lasers are within 15 GHz to ensure good injection
locking when the secondary laser is seeded.
To encode pulses in the Z-basis, the secondary laser electrical signal is
patterned to only lase in the early or late time bin of each primary pulse. To
encode pulses in the X-basis, the secondary electrical signal is a continuous
2 GHz waveform and additional voltage modulation is added to the
primary waveform: for a bit 0, no modulation is applied to the primary
waveform, so both pulses in the bit have the same phase; for a bit 1, an
amplitude modulation feature with 100 ps width is applied to the primary
electrical signal during the time between the secondary pulses being
generated—the required amplitude to achieve a π-phase shift was
determined empirically. The pulsed secondary laser output is then passed
through a bandpass spectral filter (12 GHz bandwidth) to eliminate any
spurious emission and an attenuator to reduce the mean photon flux to
the required level. All lasers are independently temperature stabilised to
0.01 °C using a PID controller and once parameters have been set, the
transmitters operate stably without need for manual adjustment or
feedback servo links between the users and Charlie.
Detection
The detectors at Charlie are superconducting nanowire SPDs with around
73% detection efficiency and 40 Hz dark counts. Time taggers are used to
record detection events with 100 ps resolution and a 300 ps gate is applied
to each 500 ps time bin measurement to suppress noise. Due to the
polarisation-dependence of SPDs and need for polarisation indistinguish-
ability for good HOM interference, a polarisation controller and polarising
beam splitter (PBS) are also included at Charlie. Polarisation is manually
adjusted to minimise the output from the PBS rejection port, then the
polarisation remains stable without further adjustment throughout our
experiment. To compensate polarisation drifts in practical deployments,
the PBS rejection port output could simply be used as a feedback signal to
automatically tune the polarisation controllers, as widely employed for
real-world QKD systems and without needing a servo channel link. There is
an additional 1.4 dB loss introduced in Charlie by the fibre-optic
components—this is accounted for in simulations and is not lumped into
the total channel loss.
MDI-QKD measurements
Using linear optics, only two of the four possible Bell states can be
measured, here comprising the ‘triplet’ state Ψþj i, corresponding to
detection events in both the early and late time bin of a given detector,
and the ‘singlet’ state Ψj i, corresponding to detection events in the early
time bin of detector 1 and the late time bin of detector 2 (or the late time
bin of detector 1 and the early time bin of detector 2). Due to SPD
deadtime (>20 ns), Ψþj i cannot be measured in practice; therefore, all
BSMs in this work correspond to Ψj i.
Each state encoding is measured separately in order to assess their gain
and QBER, using the VOA to set the intensity for decoy states (in a practical
real-time deployment, an intensity modulator could be added before the
communications channel to adjust the photon flux at GHz speeds for decoy
states). Prior to performing QKD with independent randomised encodings at
Alice and Bob, a pre-determined alignment pattern is sent with the resulting
measurements announced by Charlie, such that Alice and Bob can adjust
their timing delays to ensure good synchronisation. A reference clock is
electrically distributed between the time tagger and waveform generators,
so once aligned the system does not require adjustment. In practically
deployed implementations, the clock could be distributed optically though
multiplexing with classical communication service channels.
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